Does legal capacity -the institutional resources required to prepare and prosecute disputes -matter in the World Trade Organization? Many observers have emphasised that, under the WTO's legalistic dispute settlement regime, "right perseveres over might," trumping the role that might otherwise be played by power politics. Yet others have stressed that there can be a downside to greater legalism. WTO members can only take advantage of the rule of law if they can effectively pursue their rights in its complex legal regime, and this depends, in part, on having adequately experienced legal, economic, and diplomatic staff, working within an institutional context supported from home. To varying degrees, developing countries, in particular, lack such legal capacity, making it hard for them to fully participate in WTO dispute settlement, and jeopardising their confidence in the multilateral trade regime. For all the attention the subject has received, however, there has been no systematic assessment of legal capacity and virtually no empirical evidence about how it affects patterns of trade disputes and import protection. Our paper seeks to redress this gap.
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Executive Summary
Does legal capacity -the institutional resources required to prepare and prosecute disputes -matter in the World Trade Organization? Many observers have emphasised that, under the WTO's legalistic dispute settlement regime, "right perseveres over might," trumping the role that might otherwise be played by power politics. Yet others have stressed that there can be a downside to greater legalism. WTO members can only take advantage of the rule of law if they can effectively pursue their rights in its complex legal regime, and this depends, in part, on having adequately experienced legal, economic, and diplomatic staff, working within an institutional context supported from home. To varying degrees, developing countries, in particular, lack such legal capacity, making it hard for them to fully participate in WTO dispute settlement, and jeopardising their confidence in the multilateral trade regime. For all the attention the subject has received, however, there has been no systematic assessment of legal capacity and virtually no empirical evidence about how it affects patterns of trade disputes and import protection. Our paper seeks to redress this gap.
To this end, with support from the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the generous assistance of the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), we conducted an original survey of WTO delegations on issues bearing on legal capacity. We use the survey responses to create a novel index of legal capacity directly relevant to WTO dispute settlement and the operation of domestic trade law in its shadow. Drawing on Bown's (2006) new Global Antidumping Database (version 2.1), we examine a list of 1321 antidumping investigations conducted during the years 1995-2005 by 17 WTO Members against firms located in 33 of the WTO member states covered in our survey. Using multivariate analyses that explicitly control for indicators of the countries' market power, we assess whether targets from countries that have greater WTO legal capacity are less likely to be subjected to protectionist antidumping actions at the end of those investigations. We also test whether the targeted countries are more likely to challenge antidumping measures against them before the WTO when they possess greater legal capacity. The results indicate that legal capacity plays a very powerful role in predicting whether a member is able to bring suit against adverse trade actions by its partners. Our results also show that greater legal capacity deters such adverse antidumping actions in the first place. Our study using a large number of countries thus has produced the first direct evidence that legal capacity plays a critical role in members' ability to benefit from the WTO regime.
Introduction
Dispute settlement under the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been described as the very "backbone of the multilateral trading system" (Moore 2000) . Indeed, among international institutions, the WTO's system of adjudication is widely thought to be the most efficacious (Hudec 1993 ; Petersmann 1997, 63-5; Moore 2000, 353; Palmeter 2000, 468) . This assessment is typically traced to the fact that the system is highly legalistic, leading to the claim that, rather than being governed by power politics, "right perseveres over might" at the WTO (Lacarte-Muró and Gappah 2000, 401).
Yet observers have increasingly noted that there is a downside to greater legalism, especially as regards its relative complexity. A "rules-oriented" system like the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) can actually raise the transaction costs of settling disputes (Busch and Reinhardt 2003; Shaffer 2003b , Shaffer 2006 , putting a greater premium on legal capacity-the institutional resources required to prepare and prosecute a case-compared to market power. Members can only take advantage of the rule of law if they can effectively pursue their rights in a complex legal regime, which depends on their having an adequate number of experienced legal, economic, and diplomatic staff. To varying degrees, developing countries, in particular, lack such legal capacity, impeding their ability to participate fully in WTO dispute settlement, and thus jeopardising their confidence in the multilateral trade regime.
This concern has not gone unnoticed at the WTO. Many developed countries have been quick to fund legal capacity in developing countries and have proven receptive to various proposals by poor countries to make the DSU more user-friendly to resource-constrained Members.
1 Still, for all the attention the subject has received, there has been no systematic assessment of legal capacity and virtually no empirical evidence about how it affects patterns of trade disputes and import protection. This paper seeks to fill this yawning gap in the literature.
In concludes by teasing out implications that scholars and policymakers can draw from our study.
Background and Argument
Does legal capacity matter in WTO dispute settlement? To see why this question is interesting, consider the basics of how the system works.
Disputes arise at the WTO when a Member, the complainant, identifies an objectionable trade-related practice maintained by another Member, the defendant. The complainant must first request consultations with the defendant, the idea being to get the two sides to reach a negotiated settlement. If they fail to achieve a mutually agreed Another distinguishing feature of our paper is that, given our focus on AD duties, we can test whether legal capacity matters not only in WTO dispute settlement, but before cases are brought to Geneva. Indeed, if greater legal capacity leads to more challenges at the WTO, it should also deter the use of protectionist devices in the first place. 3 We can evaluate this feature because we have data on "non-cases," i.e., AD petitions that were investigated but then rejected domestically, offering us a unique window on the lead-up to a WTO dispute.
To see why, consider how AD petitions are vetted nationally. To start, a case is initiated by a domestic producer(s) who alleges that a foreign producer(s) is selling at "less-than-normal-value" in its home market. 4 The domestic producer(s) petitions its government to investigate this charge, which involves determining whether dumping is taking place, and, if so, whether it is causing "material injury" to the domestic producer(s). In some countries, such as the US, these determinations are rendered by separate agencies, whereas in other countries, like Brazil, they are made by a single agency. A positive finding on material injury triggers a duty to offset the margin of dumping, i.e., the difference between a "fair" price and the one being charged.
Interestingly, while it is not terribly difficult for a domestic producer(s) to secure an AD duty, the positive decisions that governments render are often more selectively targeted at a few countries, rather than at many countries. Why is there a premium on legal capacity? We contend that one of the side effects of the WTO's rules-oriented system is that the DSU has high transaction costs for settling disputes (Busch and Reinhardt 2003a; Shaffer 2003b) . At the beginning of a case, the tight enforcement of standardised terms of reference, legal disincentives for disclosure, and the rules on standing all serve to place the onus on disputants to mobilise legally as soon as possible to avoid losses on technicalities later (i.e., having the panel or AB deem a certain argument outside its terms of reference). Also, in a way that few observers have recognised, the mere fact that powerful defendants can no longer significantly delay, or block, the establishment of a panel means that legal preparation carries more weight in consultations ex ante. Ex post, the burden is no less clear; after a ruling, the prospect of a compliance panel (and possibly appeal) and, subsequently, arbitration regarding the suspension of concessions, greatly increases the incentives for foot-dragging, motivating errant defendants to delay making concessions (Shoyer 1998; Hudec 2002 ).
The complexity of WTO law only compounds the problem. As the institution reaches into non-traditional areas, from health and safety standards to technical barriers to trade, intellectual property rights, and rules governing services like banking, insurance, and transportation, the staffs of trade-related bureaucracies have had to broaden their expertise. Indeed, the agreements that took effect in 1995 added nearly 30,000 pages of new law. In addition, WTO jurisprudence has also become more demanding of contextualised factual analysis. 8 Not surprisingly, the voluminous body of WTO case law has grown accordingly, with individual rulings averaging hundreds of pages, and the acquis of case law totalling over 25,000 pages. As a result, the need for legal capacity has never been greater.
This new premium on legal capacity under the DSU is much less of a burden for most of the advanced industrial states, which generally maintain large, dedicated, permanent staffs tasked with WTO and trade law matters (Shaffer 2003a ). Poorer countries, however, have few of these resources. As a special adviser to Mike Moore, the former WTO Director-General, conceded, "America has a battery of lawyers to fight
[in] its corner, whereas small countries scrimp."
9 And yet, the problem is deeper than merely obtaining expensive legal representation. A country where the "prime minister answers the switchboard," 10 to use
Moore's evocative phrase, is "less able to manage and absorb legal advice by virtue of a well-developed institutional structure," making it a "less sophisticated buyer of legal WTO disputes and for subjective assessments of the determinants of WTO dispute outcomes. A copy of the survey is available on-line. 15 We describe in section 4 below how we created an index from the survey data, which serves as the central measure of legal capacity in our statistical analyses.
At this introductory stage, we wish to highlight the general concern about legal capacity revealed by the 52 member state delegations which answered the survey, and, in particular, in relation to power-oriented explanations for the use (and lack of use) of WTO dispute settlement. As just noted, we asked each delegation whether there had been potential WTO complaints its government had considered but chosen not to file.
We followed that with a checklist of "main considerations that led your government to choose not to file [such] cases," and then with a checklist regarding "the main considerations that motivate your government to reserve rights as a third party, instead of filing its own complaint." In response, fully 56 percent of the respondents cited the "high cost of litigation" or a "lack of private sector support" as chief reasons for not pursuing a complaint. An additional 9 percent cited "training for future disputes" as the rationale for third party intervention instead of an independent filing, meaning that 66% chose these capacity-oriented factors to explain why they intervened as a third party instead of filing their own complaint. 16 By way of comparison, a smaller proportion (49 percent) of the respondents cited inadequate market power as a reason for not filing ("lack of remedy other than suspension of concessions," "lack of credible ability to suspend concessions," or "external political pressures").
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Similarly, when we asked each delegation about the sources of advantage in WTO dispute settlement for the most powerful Members, legal capacity explanations predominated over market power ones. A striking 88 percent of the respondents answered that the advantages held by the largest Members comes from their greater legal capacity (such as, the "number and legal sophistication of government officials,"
"experience of government officials with WTO dispute settlement," their greater ability to afford the "high cost of WTO litigation," and "greater private sector support"). This stands in stark contrast to the mere 48 percent who thought that the advantages of powerful Members derive from considerations related to market power (such as "reliance on suspension of trade concessions," the "ability to apply external political (non-legal) pressure," and the "lack of retrospective remedies"). Overall, our survey reveals that the Members' delegations view legal capacity as the number one issue that shapes how effectively Members use the WTO dispute settlement system.
The Complementary Interviews
We complemented the surveys with semi-structured interviews with over three dozen Member delegates to the WTO, from a similar diversity of Members. We started the interviews with an open-ended question regarding the chief challenges for their country to make effective use of the WTO dispute settlement system. We then followed up with questions covered in the survey, while letting the interviewee take the lead in focusing on those issues of most concern to him or her. We provide here a brief overview of what the interviewees expressed.
Most developing countries noted that they confronted serious challenges due to lack of resources. For example, a representative who handled dispute settlement from one of the larger Asian countries stated that "lack of resources is our main problem," and noted problems tracing to the lack of personnel, experience, and legal knowledge, exacerbated by linguistic challenges (since only English, French and Spanish are official WTO languages). 18 Regarding the creation of a specialised dispute settlement unit, this representative stated that "we have considered it, but unfortunately do not have it." Thus he handles complaints "alone." It is "too much," he said. "I can't do it. I can take you back in my office and show you the files." He raised his hands to indicate that the stack is a few feet high. As a representative from another Asian country responded, "the largest Members have experience and numbers that are difficult to match for smaller Members, which give them an edge in playing procedural games, and in bringing cases that attempt to influence the outcome of negotiations and interpretations." 19 As a smaller Central American delegation official stressed, "our mission faces many problems,"
including "a lack of participation in WTO meetings, a lack of follow-up on issues, a lack of legal support, and a lack of human resources." 20 Yet our interviews revealed that the problem is not just in Geneva. To be sure, a number of representatives noted the lack of support from the home capital, where only a few personnel handle all WTO matters, is also a hindrance. An engaged representative from a Caribbean country stated that developing country delegates often feel "on their own" in Geneva. 21 "We need better instructions, quicker instructions, more detailed instructions," she said. In the words of a representative from one of the smaller Asian Members, the support it received from the capital was clearly "inadequate," and its personnel were "overstretched." 22 Even one of the largest developing countries found that support from the capital on dispute settlement "is bad." 23 The official stated that his country, which is relatively active compared to other members, takes decisions on disputes on an "ad hoc basis" with no system for review or decision-making and little legal assistance from the home capital or the private sector. He concluded, "we offer a good case for how things should not be done at the WTO." 24 On ranking home capital support, "I give a miserable F," he said.
Similarly, a number of interviewees cited the difficulty of participating even just as a third party in WTO complaints because of lack of support from the home capital. A Latin
American country cited one occasion on which it could not file a third party submission in time because the approval from capital took too long. 25 This same Latin American representative noted that even when they "get third party submissions from capital,"
"they are not in the proper form" and do not make a "proper argument" for panels. 26 He complained that "they are written in a totally ineffective form, they are not clear, and it can be difficult to understand the substance of the argument." Yet another Latin
American representative stated that, even when it received approval to be a third party, the lack of clear guidance constrained its ability to participate effectively. 27 In the representative's words, "we receive 'guidelines' but not concrete decisions," which limits the ability to participate in a meaningful way in an organisation where legal details matter. Sometimes the Geneva mission can only obtain a general approval to participate as a third party, but cannot get approval of a written position within the time delay set by the panel. As a result, when faced with an important case involving systemic issues, this country only put forward a vague general position, and did so orally, rather than submit a written position regarding the appropriate legal interpretation of the relevant WTO articles. Yet in a legalised dispute settlement system, this representative noted, vague third party general policy declamations are meaningless. 28 Many of our developing country interviewees cited problems with inter-agency collaboration as a complementary challenge. As a representative from a smaller Asian
Member stated, "technically we are supposed to have intra-ministerial collaboration, but it is not functioning and has not been active." 29 He maintained that there was a "lack of knowledge" and "lack of interest" in WTO matters in the home capital that made coordination among ministries a problem. A mid-sized Asian country offered the example of when it asked for assistance from the capital to identify non-tariff barriers that its exporters faced, barriers that the representative could raise and have addressed before the relevant WTO committees. He reported, however, that he "could not get the information because of lack of coordination in the capital." 30 For many of these countries, the problem is not just lack of support from the home capital or lack of coordination between ministries, but a lack of experience and expertise in any ministry. Many interviewed developing country representatives saw the main problem to be that of diplomatic rotation, when personnel circulate within or among government departments as part of traditional civil service career paths. A mid-sized
Latin American country noted that five years appears to be about the maximum time that people stay on WTO matters and then they leave for a better job, whether within government, to the private sector or for an international organisation. 31 A representative from a smaller Latin American country noted how the ministry assigns people to Geneva postings for two to three years, after which they will leave for an unrelated post. 32 An official from an Asian country similarly indicated that "turnover is a major problem because the [ministry] also handles trade promotion issues, and these professionals often get assigned to foreign posts with minimal contact with WTO issues." 33 Yet
another Asian country representative noted how its officials shift ministries, including between federal and state ministries, possibly being sent off to something "like the rural development department" where their WTO technical training clearly offers little use. 34 Although some commentators may suggest that legal capacity should not be an issue because private lawyers and the ACWL are available, our interviewees indicated that a WTO Member needs some capacity to make effective use of private law firms and the ACWL. Outside lawyers who work with developing countries on WTO matters are also quick to stress this point about the lack of continuity of personnel and lack of support for cases from the home capital. 35 Indeed, they noted how they see good people in the mission who suddenly have to leave because their term is up and they are replaced by someone who will take at least a year "to learn the ropes." They further explained that this lack of continuity undermines the expertise that has been built up. In fact, in conducting the survey, we found that representatives need some legal capacity just to understand (and thus respond to) our survey. For some representatives, even the basic WTO dispute settlement terms used in the survey required some explanation.
Hypotheses, Data and Variables
Hypotheses
We propose two hypotheses:
H1. A country with greater legal capacity is more likely to bring a suit to the WTO against an AD duty imposed on its firms by a trade partner.
H2.
A country with greater legal capacity is less likely to have a trade partner impose an AD duty against it, given its more credible threat to file for WTO dispute settlement.
The first hypothesis addresses the role of legal capacity in enabling a country to take advantage of the options afforded by the WTO to roll back a partner's trade-restrictive measure in violation of WTO rules. The second (corollary) hypothesis addresses the deterrent effect of such legal capacity. This corollary hypothesis follows if we are right that target countries with greater legal capacity will be more prone to file suit against an AD measure at the WTO. If so, then AD-using countries should anticipate this potential reaction and will less likely impose AD duties against imports from the target country.
The explanation for the corollary hypothesis has less to do with individual firm behaviour than with a country's administration of its AD laws. Firms petitioning for AD duties may not be concerned about the prospect of a WTO filing because they receive the benefits of AD protection, or of a market-sharing agreement, during the drawn-out period in which litigation and negotiation occurs. with a panel ruling on this front thus raises the problem of "dirty hands," complicating its ability to get others to settle on favourable terms in subsequent complaints of its own.
Third, while the firms petitioning for import relief would not be directly affected, the government that imposes an AD measure also faces increased odds of foreign retaliation if a WTO complaint is filed. Such retaliation, whether through authorised suspension of concessions via a dispute settlement ruling, or through "vigilante justice"
achieved by AD actions by the target country (Bown 2005) , is surely more likely when the foreign government has secured a legal victory at the WTO. As a result, the target's legal capacity, which makes it more likely to file a WTO complaint, should also deter fellow WTO member states from imposing AD measures against its firms in the first place. Hence our corollary hypothesis.
Before turning to the empirical tests, it is important to keep in mind the alternative explanation for the phenomena we seek to explain. Even if legal capacity played no role in WTO dispute settlement, developing countries might still be less likely to file and win a WTO dispute 36 because of power-oriented disadvantages. In particular, the traditional problem for developing countries is their lack of market power, which means they cannot impose punitive tariffs that would hurt a defendant more than they would hurt 
Data and Variables
We test our hypotheses using data combined from two main sources. The first is our survey of WTO delegations, which provides detailed information about variations in dispute-related legal capacity across member states. The second is a dataset of antidumping investigations and measures imposed by 17 different countries during the period 1995-2005. This dataset provides a framework for examining the "dogs that don't bark," that is, cases that might have been, but were not, brought before the WTO as disputes, as well as instances of trade protection that were contemplated but were not imposed in the first place.
Measures of Legal Capacity
From our survey, we have created a combined index of legal capacity that we call 
Other Explanatory Variables
To isolate the impact of legal capacity on the pattern of WTO complaints and import across the 1321 AD investigations in the sample. 42 We also control for (the natural logarithm of) each state's gross domestic product (GDP) and level of economic development, in the form of logged per capita GDP, in constant 2000 USD prices. 43 (As noted earlier, our survey-derived measure of disputespecific legal capacity is not very strongly correlated with per capita income.) Finally, we observe that the United States and other antidumping users designate certain countries as "Non-Market Economies" (NMEs) for the purposes of "less-than-fair-value" pricing assessments. In such cases, the authorities typically base their "normal value" figure on the cost of the relevant factor inputs in market economies of comparable levels of development, which also produce the goods in question. This use of substitute data tends to make the case easier to prove. We accordingly add a dichotomous control variable, Non-Market Economy, to flag such country targets. 44 Four countries 45 are
NMEs at some point in the dataset, constituting 13 percent of the investigations.
Econometric Models
We estimate two sets of two probit models (four in total). The first set takes the 849
positive AD measures and asks whether the target chooses to file a WTO complaint. 
where F is the standard normal cumulative density function. As a sensitivity test, we also estimate a version of the same equation, Model 2, with Bureaucratic Quality substituted in place of Capacity Score.
The second set of models start with all 1321 antidumping investigations, asking whether the outcome is an affirmative AD measure (i.e. whether the AD-imposing country is deterred from levying AD duties on the target). The equation for Model 3 is: 
Results
The results of Models 1-2 and 3-4 are shown in Tables 2 and 3 , respectively. The evidence consistently supports our argument. The indicators of legal capacity are substantively and statistically significant predictors of whether a country targeted by an AD action chooses to file a WTO complaint. Moving back in the process, they also strongly predict whether the country conducting an AD investigation elects to impose AD measures on that target in the first place. These findings shine through even though we control for the role of market power and other important case characteristics, and they are robust to a number of other challenges as well.
5.1
Which AD Measures Are Challenged in WTO Disputes?
For a first cut at answering this question, we generated a simple graph plotting the proportion of the 849 AD measures that each target country challenged in WTO disputes. This is Figure 1 , whose x-axis is the country's value of Capacity Score. The size of the "bubble" for each country in Figure 1 Controlling for its level of development, market size, and bilateral trade share, a country with greater WTO-specific legal capacity is significantly more likely to file a WTO complaint against another Member's AD action.
Legal capacity thus has a strong substantive impact on the odds of filing WTO disputes, after controlling for market power. Holding all other variables at their sample means, using the estimates from Model 1, the predicted probability of a WTO complaint is 0.013 [0.002, 0.058] for a country with the sample's 10 th percentile value of Capacity Score. 46 Moving to the sample's average level of legal capacity increases the predicted 
Conclusion
Legal capacity matters. Members of the WTO who possess greater legal capacity enjoy a distinct advantage over the majority of countries for whom the requisite institutional resources are scarce. We find, in particular, that those countries that are abundant in legal capacity are more likely to challenge AD duties brought against them, and less likely to be targeted by AD duties in the first place. These results are especially striking in light of the fact that we control for these countries' market power, which makes credible their threat to retaliate. Doing so allows us to speak directly to the conventional wisdom, which says that power considerations are paramount in explaining these outcomes. In fact, as our evidence shows, legal capacity affects patterns of dispute initiation and underlying antidumping protection among WTO members at least as much as market power, if not more.
Several implications follow. First, investments in legal capacity can promise sizable returns, especially for developing countries. As our results make clear, even modest gains in legal capacity can result in greater use of WTO dispute settlement by poorer complainants and greater deterrence of protectionist procedures against their exports.
In our view, legal capacity is thus a crucial clue in explaining why developing countries file WTO complaints less frequently than developed countries do when confronted with potentially challengeable protectionist measures by their partners. It also helps explain why more AD investigations against their firms, as opposed to those against firms located in wealthier countries, end with the imposition of duties.
Second, our findings suggest that experience, and not simply number of personnel, matters most. Sometimes a country's development of such legal capacity is sparked by being a respondent, as in the case of Brazil. 49 In other cases, such as Bangladesh (which was the first and only least developed country to file a WTO complaint), its ability to overcome internal perceptions of political risks, and its resulting successful settlement of its complaint against an Indian AD measure, so motivated the government that it created a new specialised WTO cell in its department of commerce, thereby increasing its legal capacity for the future. 50 Our study shows that countries that invest in developing professional staff who retain expertise in WTO matters over time, that develop specialised WTO dispute settlement units, and that work with their private sectors are better-positioned to roll back and deter barriers to their exports.
Third, as our counterfactual exercises reveal, all WTO members would be economically better off if more countries enjoyed greater legal capacity. Indeed, our estimates show that not only would there be more litigation over AD duties, but that, as a consequence, there would be far fewer AD duties to begin with, if only Members had the resources that the US (and a few others) dedicate to trade policy and law. 51 In this light, the contributions being made to building legal capacity in developing countries promise to yield returns not only for these countries, but for global economic welfare as well. The challenges, of course, remain-those of building legal capacity in light of political pressures in the largest developed countries to protect domestic producing interests, as well as the constrained resources, other immediate needs and general governance challenges that many developing countries face. Our study, nonetheless, demonstrates the benefits that can be obtained. Endnotes 1 For example, ten developed countries each have contributed at least one million dollars (and some more than three million) to the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL), the most important source for legal assistance to developing countries in WTO dispute settlement. The list of such donors includes Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Notably, the US, the European Union (EU), and Japan have not provided any financial support to the ACWL (although some individual EU member states have done so). 2 There is some ambiguity in DSU rules, in particular regarding whether an article 21.5 proceeding on compliance must precede an article 22.2 request for authorization of retaliation. What we describe, however, has been WTO practice. 3 Whether or not one normatively supports antidumping procedures, they clearly provide protection to domestic producers against foreign trade, reducing competition in the domestic market and increasing prices for consumers (a category which includes domestic industries purchasing the protected products as inputs). 4 These calculations are quite complicated, and subject to many alternatives, exceptions and other nuances. In general, however, according to Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 (Antidumping), "a product is to be considered as being dumped… if the export price of the product exported from one country to another is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country." Dumping is thus deemed to occur even if the cost of production is lower than the export price (i.e. even where the exporter still makes a profit). 14 We attempted to be present as frequently as possible when the survey respondent filled the responses to ensure that the wording of the questions was unambiguous and understood in the same way by all respondents. We kept track of this in order to control for the manner in which the survey was completed.
We found that the manner of completing the survey had no impact on our findings. 15 A copy of the survey is available at userwww.service.emory.edu/~erein/research/survey.pdf. 16 Third parties only have limited rights in the proceeding to make one (usually brief) written and oral presentation. 17 49 percent cited weak legal merits as a reason for not filing some complaints.
used to the country's advantage so that greater expertise in WTO matters can matter. Author interview, July 21, 2005. 51 Pushing this point one step farther, it is also likely that countries with the legal capacity necessary to deter others' use of AD actions may, ironically, be more able to form domestic AD mechanisms and defensively invoke AD actions of their own. It may seem at first blush that this possibility would detract from the global welfare benefits of additional WTO-specific legal capacity. However, Kucik and Reinhardt (2007) provide large-scale evidence substantiating the fact that countries establishing their own AD mechanisms use them as a device to co-opt domestic protectionist interests that would otherwise be opposed to liberalisation. The result is dramatically greater cuts in bound and applied tariffs. (See also Finger and Nogues 2005). Consequently, if legal capacity enables countries to form sophisticated AD systems of their own, then it should indirectly facilitate significantly broader and deeper tariff liberalisation as well. 52 The numbers on the graph are randomly-assigned codes for each country in the survey. The size of each country's circle is proportional to the number of AD measures imposed against its firms in the analysis sample.
